The paper examines whether patterns of service level spending in capitated managed care plans differ from those in traditional non-managed care health plans. We apply the service selection model of Ellis and McGuire (2007) to recent, highly disaggregated commercial insurance data from Medstat MarketScan. Rankings of services by selection incentives give largely the same rankings as the EM results for Medicare. We next calculate selection indices separately for four types of health plans: non-managed care comprehensive, preferred provider organization (PPO) plans, managed care point of service (POS) and health maintenance organization (HMO) plans. Our results imply high correlations and similar rankings of selection indices across plan types. We then test whether services predicted to be underprovided indeed have less than average rates of spending by managed care plans, while non-managed care plans have above average rates of spending. Stronger evidence of selection distortions among the four plan types is found when decomposing spending by type of service and provider specialty than by place of service.
Introduction
There has long been concern that because of capitation, managed care plans have strong incentives to attract healthy enrollees. Selective marketing and explicit exclusion of high cost enrollees are generally illegal or restricted, yet plans may instead distort the medical services offered so as to affect individual enrollment decisions. A series of recent papers have shown that service-level distortions --i.e. the underprovision of services used primarily by consumers that are relatively sick and overprovision of services that are used primarily by the healthy --are potentially profitable. No one has actually tested whether the services identified by these models are those distorted in practice. This paper is the first one to address this question by empirically linking service distortion measures with disaggregated service spending patterns for both managed care and non-managed care plans.
Identifying and correcting selection incentives has been the topic of many recent studies, both theoretical and empirical. Glazer and McGuire (2000, henceforth GM) develop the concept of optimal risk adjustment, which uses the plan payment formula to correct service level distortion incentives facing capitated managed care plans. They set up a game-theoretical model in which each plan competes on the basis of service quality in the context of prospective payment and potential adverse selection. They find that imperfect conventional risk adjustment, which pays plans the expected cost of each enrollee conditional on observable characteristics, is not sufficient to balance plans' incentives to seek favorable patients when consumers have private information. In comparison to conventional risk adjustment, the optimal risk adjustment they propose takes into account selection process and overpays health plans for high risk enrollees and underpays for low risk enrollees. Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000, henceforth FGM) build on GM by more explicitly modeling service level distortion decisions. They assume plans are profit maximizers and could manipulate service quality given that consumers have more information than is used by the risk adjustment formula. They assume that health plans use "shadow prices" to choose how tightly to ration each health care service, and ration services that attract unprofitable enrollees more tightly. They derive expressions for the "shadow price" and use it to generate predictions about which services will be over-or under-supplied using US Medicaid data. Ellis and McGuire (2007, henceforth EM) make further progress in quantifying health plan selection incentives. Based on the FGM model, they derive a relatively straightforward and empirically implemental selection index, which is the product of two measures ---Predictability and Predictiveness (explained in detail below). They show the direction and magnitude of selection incentives in modeling disaggregated spending by type of service (TOS) and provider specialty (PS). Using Medicare data from 1996 and 1997, they calculate selection indices and find that services such as hospice care, home health care, and durable medical equipment are the most vulnerable ones to under provision, while services such as eye procedures and MRIs are prone to overprovision.
Using a different approach, Cao and McGuire (2003) examine spending of Medicare fee for service (FFS) sector in 1996 to identify services that are positively or negatively correlated with the county-level market penetration of HMO. In their model, FFS sector spending on services which are more tightly rationed by HMOs has positive correlation with HMO market share. They also find evidence of significant service-distortion in services such as Part A mental disorders and Part B psychiatry and general surgery; however their data did not permit them to look at service utilization within HMOs, which only accounted for16 percent of the Medicare population at that time. Eggleston and Bir (2007) propose a new measure called the Net Marginal Benefit of Risk Selection and use this concept to quantify benefits from selection using a sample from Massachusetts public employee health plans. They show that the EM selection indices are very similar using indemnity and managed care plan data. They also find that cardiac care, diabetes care, mental health and substance abuse services are the most vulnerable services to be underprovided. They do not formally test whether this under-provision is consistent with the prediction of the model. This paper builds upon the approach of FGM and EM, using richer data to test several predictions of their framework. We overcome two weaknesses of the earlier work, which are that their Medicare or Medicaid samples do not represent privately insured population, and the utilization patterns they examine are not of managed care since they use data from traditional indemnity plans. Our 2003 and 2004 privately insured Medstat MarketScan database contains diverse enrollees who enroll in non-managed care comprehensive (COMP) and preferred provider (PPO) plans as well as enrollees in managed care plans, such as point of service (POS) and health maintenance organization (HMO) plans. Using utilization patterns and selection indices of managed and non-managed care plans, we have three goals: 1. to examine whether service level selection indices for managed care plans are similar to those of non-managed care plans, which is to say whether all plan types face similar incentives to distort certain services; 2. to determine whether the pattern of over-and under-providing certain services in each plan type corresponds to the predictions of the selection index models; 3. to identify whether service level selection effort is more intense on type of service, provider specialty or place of service.
Ellis-McGuire index
In this section we reproduce derivation of the selection index formula proposed by EM (2007) .
A health plan offers S services. An individual's expectation about the value of services she will receive determines her choice of the plan. Let ˆi s m denote the amount that individual i expects the plan will spend on providing service s and let
where utility from services is assumed to be additively separable, hence can be written as
where i μ is the valuation the individual places on the next best alternative plan.
A managed care plan is assumed to efficiently ration the amount of health care each patient receives. Let s q denote the service-specific shadow price a plan sets for service s . A patient will receive a quantity of services, is m , which is determined by: as the predictiveness, capturing the correlation between expected spending on each service and actual total spending. The formula suggests that services with high positive product of predictability and predictiveness will be more tightly rationed, i.e., have the highest elasticity of profit with regard to rationing.
Data
We To obtain individual usage per year, we sum up spending on outpatient, inpatient and drug claims by enrollee ID, year and information decomposition. The key spending variable we focus on is the "covered charge," the field on claims that best approximates the total payments to providers for each service. As others have pointed out this field (which includes the patients'
out-of-pocket spending) is imprecise in that it does not necessarily reflect any provider bonuses or discounts, however we have no ability to correct this. Also, many inpatient facility records reflect DRG payments rather than service-based fees, which we cannot change. As discussed below, we develop both pooled models and models that are confined to individual health plan types, and get largely similar results 4 .
Estimation strategy
We first replicate the approach of EM and test the predictive power of various R between predicted and actual spending. As shown in our results section the three specifications behave similarly, so we focus entirely on the weighted LS model for the rest of our analysis.
Our next step is to calculate the EM selection indices using the weighted LS predictions from each of our service decompositions: spending by TOS, by PS and by PLAC. We calculate these indices once using a pooled regression with data from all plan types and run new regressions and recalculate the selection indices separately using samples from each plan type 5 .
Comparisons across four models are made both in terms of rankings and correlation coefficients. Our goal is to see whether all plan types face similar incentives to distort certain services.
The third stage of our analysis considers the relationship between each service selection index and relative actual spending on that service. Because services vary in their means so much by plan types, we normalize spending on each service by dividing spending in each plan type on each service by the grand mean spending across all plan types on that service, and then calculate correlation coefficients and make scatter plots showing the relationship between selection index and relative actual spending on same service. This step helps us identify whether the services predicted to be distorted by our prediction are the ones actually manipulated by plans. It also helps clarify whether service level selection effort is more intense on TOS, PS or PLAC decomposition. 5 We choose 4 plan types with the highest market share, accounting for over 96 percent enrollment in year 2004 in the Marketscan data. They are PPO (44.62%), POS (17.52%), HMO (20.09%) and COMP (14.26%). We drop basic/major medical (0%), point of service with capitation (3.5%) and exclusive provider organizations (0.02%) because of their smaller sample sizes. For each broad category of spending, average spending increases from 2003 to 2004 for all plan types without exception, among which HMO spending increases the most. If we compare HMO with COMP, the average age of HMO plan enrollees is around six years younger than that of COMP plan enrollees, associated with total spending being approximately half of comprehensive plan's total spending whereas total spending of PPO and POS lies in 6 We calculate annualized spending for year 2004, weighted by fraction of the year enrolled in a plan type.
Empirical results
between. These large differences in average spending across plans reflect differences in enrollee's health status, as well as differences in health plan generosity. Due to adverse selection, older and less healthy consumers will prefer more generous health plan options such as COMP and PPO relative to POS and HMO plans.
Predictive power of different information sets for total spending
We first compare the predictive power of various models using We do observe, however, that models estimated on commercial data tend to have higher 2 R than those reported by EM using Medicare data. A similar finding was reported in Ash et al (2000) . Given the same diagnostic classification system used by us and by EM, this probably reflects the greater variation of age in commercial samples and more recent data we use as well.
The fact that our spending variable includes prescription drug spending whereas EM did not is another possible explanation. This ordering reconfirms the higher predictiveness of TOS found in EM, although in their study the PS decomposition tends to predict total spending slightly better than PLAC. 7 In light of the similarity in predictive power of these alternative specifications, we choose to follow EM and use disaggregated lagged spending by TOS to predict 2004 TOS spending variables, lagged spending by PS to predict 2004 PS spending, and lagged spending by PLAC to predict PLAC spending. Table 2 8 presents the results from an analysis using spending by TOS with the information set being age gender dummies together with lagged spending by TOS. Spending by TOS is the appropriate partition of total spending to focus on if the primary mechanism for health plans to influence enrollee selection is by constraining specific services that are provided to patients. All regression models used weighted LS with annualized spending. Table 2 summarizes the numerical selection indices for all the TOS categories and we include all the plan types 9 . Column 1 shows the weighted sample mean for each service and Column 2 presents the conventional R², calculated from the weighted OLS regression for each TOS spending by using the full array of 33 lagged TOS and age/gender dummies as controlled variables.
Results by type of service (TOS)

All plans
The third column of Table 2 is the proposed EM predictability measure ---the coefficient of variation of expected (not actual) spending. We find that home/mobile clinic, hospice, home visit, and SNF/intermediate care have the highest coefficients of variation, which means that expected spending on these services has a relatively high explained variation across individuals relative to their predicted means. This high variability in predicted spending makes these services attractive to under-supply in order to influence selection. For the services with 7 This could be the reason that PLAC codes are more standardized nationally and across plan types than provider specialty codes in commercial claims data, but we do not know this to be true. 8 Table 2 doesn't drop individuals who switch from one plan type to another from 2003 to 2004. Our results are highly robust if we only keep non-switchers sample. 9 We dropped three types of services in the TOS model results. We dropped "Dialysis" since there is a special program in Medicare for people with kidney function failure, hence spending on this type of service is incomplete. We dropped "Indian/tribal facility, no procedure code", due to its low mean. We also dropped "Missing, unknown". For each of the decompositions, we delete any service in which mean spending in any one of the four plan types is less than $0.50 per person per year.
low coefficient of variation, the standard variation of expected spending is small relative to the predicted mean. Expected spending on services such as office visits, ambulatory procedures, anesthesia, and lab tests have relatively small coefficients of variation. The fourth column is the proposed predictiveness index, which is Pearson's correlation coefficient between individual predicted service spending and total actual spending. We can see that inpatient facility, consultations and anesthesia have high predictiveness measures, whereas, home/mobile clinic, hospice, home visit, SNF/intermediate service are highly predictable but not particularly predictive.
As the EM model indicates, services with a higher product of predictability and predictiveness imply a greater incentive to ration care. The selection indices using the full sample are shown in column five. Services are sorted by descending selection indices so that services most vulnerable to under-provision are at the top. The most tightly rationed service is home/mobile clinic, followed by home visits, hospice care, SNF/intermediate care, oncology, DME, office/clinic/ambulatory center, hospital visit and inpatient facility. In contrast, office visits, emergency room, ambulatory procedures, echography, specialist, major procedure, endoscopy, anesthesia and standard imaging are the least tightly rationed types of services. The selection index for predicted total spending captures the average incentive to select across all kinds of services, and hence provides a useful benchmark for dividing services that are vulnerable to be over-and under supplied.
The indices we obtain here are consistent with EM in terms of their ranking orders, but are larger in magnitude. The correlation between our indices and EM indices on the same services is 0.64. One possible explanation for the differences is that the data used here comes from commercial plans, which are more profit-oriented and strongly rationed than the traditional comprehensive plans in Medicare program. We also observe that oncology services are predicted to be overprovided in EM, but underprovided in our data, which seems more consistent with our intuition.
Comparison of four plan types
We next calculate separate selection indices for each plan type. Rather than pooling across all individuals in all plan types, we run separate regression models for each of the 33 To sum up what we have discussed so far, all the plan types face similar incentives to ration services to increase profits if premiums are truly capitated. The fundamental properties of predictability and predictiveness are largely the same across plan types and similar between Medicare and commercially insured plans. Even though incentives are similar, plan types differ in the effectiveness with which they respond to these incentives. Selective contracting and service distortion by TOS at HMOs and to a lesser extent by POS plans suggests that on average these managed care plans are successful at restricting services as the selection indices increase. Among four plan types, COMP plan is the recipient of the worst selection of enrollees. Its relative spending on services goes up noticeably as selection indices increase, whereas relative spending of other plan types drops.
Results by provider specialty (PS)
We now repeat the analysis using spending by provider specialty, with the information set being age/gender dummies and lagged spending by provider specialty. If the primary mechanism for health plans to influence enrollee selection is the choice of providers with who to contract, then the appropriate partition of total spending on which to focus is by provider specialty. Our study shows that on the one hand SNF/intermediate care, home/mobile clinic, rheumatology and hospice 10 are the four services associated with the highest predictability. On the other hand, inpatient facility, pharmacy, radiology and ambulance service supplier are the most predictive services. Overall, SNF/intermediate care, home/mobile clinic, oncology and hospice are most vulnerable services for selection, whereas chiropractic, dermatology, multispecialty clinic and gynecology are subject to the least distortion. It's interesting to see that the index of psychiatry/psychology is below the average level, which confirms the results in Eggleston and Bir (2007) 11 .
As the case of TOS decomposition, it also holds true for PS decomposition (shown in Appendix Table A 
Results by place of service (PLAC)
Finally we apply the same techniques to study place of service (PLAC) decomposition.
Once again we use lagged place of service spending and age/gender dummies for prediction.
The results are shown in figure 3 12 . There is weaker relationship between service-level spending and the selection indices by place of service decomposition. It's perceivable due to the fact that place of service doesn't reveal the conditions of patients, since patients with different by places where services actually take place. But we still observe that non-managed care plans suffer from adverse selection. Managed care plans tend to ration services with high selection indices more tightly. 12 We dropped 17 PLAC categories due to low sample means. To summarize our finding on the third research question, Table 3 strongly suggests that the TOS decomposition is more effective for influencing services than PS and PLAC. This suggests that utilization review and gatekeepers restrictions on use of certain services are more important than selective contracting with certain provider specialties and places of service. 
Comparison across TOS, PS and PLAC Decomposition
Risk selection with risk adjusted premiums
One assumption used thus far is that premiums faced by enrollees are same regardless of their choices of plan types. Under this assumption, the predictiveness component in the EM index, which is based upon the variability of profit around zero, is the negative of the variability of total health care spending around its mean, which is also the actuarially fair premium. The only difference is the sign change since profit is equal to premium deducted by plan spending on providing medical services.
A potential criticism of our results thus far is that we calculate the EM index without allowing premiums to vary at all across plans. Most employers and health plans at least adjust premiums for age and gender composition of their enrollees, and may even adjust premiums using risk adjustment information such as health status or prior use information. FGM demonstrate that the selection incentives are similar even with risk adjustment, but it is informative to repeat and extend their analysis here. For this section, we recalculate selection indices while simulating conventional premiums that reflect age and gender, or age, gender and prior year health conditions as captured by the DCG/HCC model (Ash et al, 2000) .
It turns out that our findings are highly robust to risk adjustment. The relationship between our selection indices and observed mean spending by TOS remains similar even after 13 All of the results shown in this paper are for a sample of adults, regardless of whether they are in single or family coverage contracts. We repeated our analysis using the subsample of adults in single contracts, and obtained very similar rankings of services and correlations with meanratios. We also did the analysis while including children as well as adults and again obtained very similar results. We present only one set of these results here. Spending decomposed by TOS is the most informative approach, with R² being as high as 21 percent, but alternative decompositions do almost as well. A simple weighted least square model was found to do nearly as well as more complex models, so we have used it for our main results.
The new contribution of our paper is that we examine selection incentives for various types of managed and non-managed care commercial plans. We find that the EM selection indices are very similar across all four plan types, and hence studies using only non-managed care data to calculate the indices are not significantly biased. We expect our study will help to improve the health plan payment policy. Our findings point to the value of increased risk adjustment and supply-side cost sharing to mitigate selection incentives. The services identified as prone to be distorted are important for policy makers to monitor so as to avoid or neutralize commercial plans' incentives. The results have implications for managed care regulation, capitation formula, employment based insurance, provider payment, and health system research. Table A2 The magnitude and ranking of indices of each type of service for 4 plan types Sorted in order of most highly indices for all plan types 
